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Background: Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-
CoV-2) is transmitted predominantly through the air in crowded and 
unventilated indoor spaces among unvaccinated people. Universities 
and colleges are potential settings for its spread. 
Methods: An interdisciplinary team from public health, virology, and 
biology used narrative methods to summarise and synthesise 
evidence on key control measures, taking account of mode of 
transmission. 
Results: Evidence from a wide range of primary studies supports six 
measures. Vaccinate (aim for > 90% coverage and make it easy to get 
a jab). Require masks indoors, especially in crowded settings. If 
everyone wears well-fitting cloth masks, source control will be high, 
but for maximum self-protection, respirator masks should be worn. 
 Masks should not be removed for speaking or singing. Space people 
out by physical distancing (but there is no “safe” distance because 
transmission risk varies with factors such as ventilation, activity levels 
and crowding), reducing class size (including offering blended 
learning), and cohorting (students remain in small groups with no 
cross-mixing). Clean indoor air using engineering 
controls—ventilation (while monitoring CO2 levels), inbuilt filtration 
systems, or portable air cleaners fitted with high efficiency particulate 
air [HEPA] filters). Test asymptomatic staff and students using 
lateral flow tests, with tracing and isolating infectious cases when 
incidence of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is high. Support 
clinically vulnerable people to work remotely. There is no direct 
evidence to support hand sanitising, fomite controls or temperature-
taking. There is evidence that freestanding plastic screens, face visors 
and electronic air-cleaning systems are ineffective. 
Conclusions: The above six evidence-based measures should be 
combined into a multi-faceted strategy to maximise both student 
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safety and the continuation of in-person and online education 
provision. Staff and students seeking to negotiate a safe working and 
learning environment should collect data (e.g. CO2 levels, room 
occupancy) to inform conversations.
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SARS-CoV-2, aerosol transmission, hierarchy of controls, higher 
education policy, infection prevention and control
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Introduction
Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2) and university life
The United Kingdom (UK) is currently (Autumn 2021) expe-
riencing high and rising levels of coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19) cases, and almost all are the highly contagious 
delta variant1. This variant spread fastest among the 17–24 year 
age group in June and July 20212, likely due to a combina-
tion of low vaccination rates in this age group and suboptimal 
mitigation strategies in schools and colleges. Whilst 
young people are much less likely to develop severe acute 
disease from COVID-19 than older people, some will be 
hospitalised and a few could die3. The incidence of persistent 
symptoms beyond the acute illness (post-acute or “long” Covid4) 
is disputed, but a secondary analysis of Office of National 
Statistics data (published as a preprint) suggests that 4.7% 
of the 18–24 year age group have some symptoms persisting 
beyond 12 weeks and 1.1% have symptoms which interfere 
“a lot” with their daily activities5. University staff and gradu-
ate students include older age groups, minority ethnic groups 
and those with medical conditions, all of which increase 
the risk of developing serious complications from COVID-19.
For all these reasons, measures to reduce transmission of the 
virus are needed. Most universities and colleges in the UK 
now have the infrastructure to implement rapid and frequent 
testing and support students to isolate when necessary. Since 
most courses were delivered online in 2020–21, they have 
also learnt a great deal about how to deliver effective learning 
online. There is, however, a considerable appetite to return to 
face-to-face modes of teaching as well as return to traditional 
levels of socialising, arts and sport.
The science of SARS-CoV-2 transmission
There is strong and consistent evidence that the main—and 
perhaps the only significant—mode of transmission of 
SARS-CoV-2 is through the air6,7. Indeed, super-spreader 
events (in which one or a few people infect large numbers of 
others)—including choir practices, funerals, conferences, gym 
sessions and other mass indoor events—are likely to be the 
main drivers of the pandemic8. Higher education includes 
many preconditions for such super-spreader events, including 
living and eating communally, lectures and seminars, sports 
training and competition, arts and singing performances, and 
socialising.
Some indoor events show no COVID-19 transmission, even 
when infected people are present, while others are shown in 
retrospect to have been super-spreader events; this phenomenon 
is known as heterogeneity or overdispersion of transmission 
dynamics, and is highly relevant to our efforts to control the 
virus in schools and universities9. Whilst the highest risk of 
airborne viral transmission occurs with coughing and sneezing, 
speaking and singing are also high-risk activities10,11.
A landmark paper on minimising risk of airborne transmission 
(written before effective vaccines had been discovered) 
used their own adaptation of the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention’s “hierarchy of controls” (Figure 1)12. 
In the sections which follow, we consider all the measures 
in the hierarchy of controls plus vaccination. We begin with 
vaccination, masking and administrative controls as these are 
things which individual university employees may be able to 
influence. We then discuss engineering controls (ventilation and 
air filtration).
Methods
This review, which aimed to produce a synthesis rapidly in 
time for the new university term, was undertaken in September 
2021. We began with sources known to the authors, 
including a rapid review by Independent SAGE1, and a search 
of the PubMed database using the terms “SARS-CoV-2”, 
“COVID-19”, “transmission”, “mitigation”, “school[s]” and 
“university/ies” (restricted to review articles). Using a method 
previously shown to be highly efficient for identifying key 
studies from complex and heterogeneous datasets13, we 
initially focused on seminal papers (in high-impact journals 
and highly-cited for their age) and used snowball searching 
(tracking the article in Google Scholar and pursuing relevant 
sources from its reference lists) to identify further key stud-
ies from these. For specialist subsections that were beyond 
our own expertise, we undertook further key word searches 
(e.g. HEPA filters) and consulted with experts in the field. 
In producing our narrative synthesis of these sources, we 
prioritised findings that would be useful to inform actual 
policies in universities.
Figure 1. The hierarchy of controls for an infectious pathogen (reproduced under Creative Commons licence from 12).
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Main findings
Direct empirical evidence on mitigation strategies specifi-
cally for universities was sparse, but there was much relevant 
evidence on mitigation measures more generally. Our review 
suggested that six key measures, which we consider in turn 
below, are likely to be effective at reducing on-campus spread: 
vaccination, masking, spacing people out (physical distanc-
ing, reducing class size and cohorting), engineering controls 
(ventilation or filtration of air), a test/trace/isolate policy when 
COVID-19 incidence is high, and supporting clinically vulner-
able people to work remotely. Other widely-promoted meas-
ures including sanitising hands, taking temperatures, plastic 
screens and face visors, were not supported by evidence.
Encourage vaccination—and make it easy
Vaccines have been a game-changer for COVID-19; they 
dramatically reduce the incidence of symptomatic disease and 
risk of transmission of the virus to others; breakthrough infec-
tions in vaccinated persons are rare and generally mild14. 
A recent BMJ review concluded that the most important 
single intervention for preventing on-campus transmission is 
vaccination15. These authors suggest that if 90% of staff and 
students are fully vaccinated, campuses may be able to reopen 
safely without other measures. However, this 90% cut-off is 
based on a single preprint modelling study16 that has yet to be 
peer-reviewed.
The evidence, while sparse, supports strenuous efforts to increase 
the proportion of staff and students who are fully vaccinated. 
Most universities are a long way from meeting a 90% target. As 
of end September 2021, for example, only 58% of 18–24 year 
olds in England were fully vaccinated17. This is partly 
because younger age groups were the last to be invited, but 
also because of relatively high levels of vaccine hesitancy 
among student age groups, due to a combination of perceived 
low vulnerability and the “inconvenience” of attending 
for a jab15. One key measure for improving safety is to make 
it very easy for people to get a vaccination on campus—for 
example by locating vaccination hubs close to settings 
frequented by target groups (e.g. outside lecture theatres or 
dining halls) and not requiring paperwork that people are 
unlikely to be carrying.
Vaccination, however, is unlikely to be the sole measure to 
protect students and staff. Another preprint modelling study, 
which used the delta variant, found that even at 100% coverage, 
vaccination was insufficient to eliminate SARS-CoV-2 trans-
mission in a university dormitory setting18. Some vulnerable 
groups are unable to receive the vaccine or mount an effective 
immune response to it19. An individual interacting with 
another group of people in a university setting has no way 
of knowing what proportion of them are vaccinated. For all 
these reasons, other measures are likely to be needed for the 
foreseeable future.
Everyone should wear masks
Masking has two main effects: reducing emission of the virus 
by the wearer (“source control”), and protecting the wearer 
from virus emitted by others20–22. It also has a third potential 
effect—reminding us that we are still in a pandemic and 
signalling to others that we are taking their safety seriously23.
Reviews of a wide range of evidence (including laboratory 
studies and natural experiments) have shown that, broadly 
speaking, masks are effective—but by no means perfect—for 
source control20–22. Masks reduce the amount of virus that 
gets into the air, and hence the probability that someone 
else in the room will be infected22. Wearing a mask reduces 
viral emissions from coughing and sneezing approximately 
20-fold24, but around half of all people who transmit the virus 
have no symptoms at the time (i.e. they are not coughing or 
sneezing but simply exhaling the virus in aerosols)25. Differ-
ent materials for cloth masks have very different filtration 
properties26; a well-fitting mask with no leaks round the 
side is crucial27. A double-layer neck gaiter (bandana) and a 
medical mask both reduce emission of aerosols by around 
60%, but respirator (FFP2 or FFP3, N95) masks are much 
more effective, blocking up to 99% of aerosols28. Note that face 
visors reduced aerosol emission by only 5%—i.e. they are 
ineffective28.
There have been claims that randomised controlled trial 
(RCT) evidence is the only “robust” way to test the impact of 
masks. This is incorrect, because most such RCTs are designed 
only to test the hypothesis that the mask protects the wearer 
over a short period. Actually, masks work mainly by protecting 
other people, and even a non-statistically significant 
effect on transmission dynamics (e.g. in lectures) can lead 
to very large effects over time (for example, if instead of 
doubling every 9 days, new cases increased by only 1.9-fold, 
after 180 days cases would be down by 60%).
The above findings support mandating (rather than just 
encouraging) masking in shared spaces. If everyone is wear-
ing a mask, source control will be high and double-layer cloth 
masks will be adequate for most healthy people. In one recent 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) report, 
US schools without mask mandates in July-August 2021 
were 3.5 times more likely to have COVID-19 outbreaks 
than schools with mandates29. To protect the wearer effectively 
from airborne virus when others in the room are unmasked, 
a higher grade of filtration is needed, hence in the absence 
of near-universal use of source control masks, individu-
als may be left with little choice but to consider respirators20. 
Those who are clinically vulnerable (hence requiring masks 
for self-protection) should use respirators in any case.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument for masks in the 
university context is that if everyone wears one, there is a 
much lower risk that teaching will need to return to online as 
a result of rising case numbers.
Since speaking and singing increase emission of aerosols10,11, 
masks should be worn continuously indoors and not removed 
for these activities. The suggestion in some universities that 
masks should be worn only until people are seated but may 
be removed thereafter makes no scientific sense. Indeed, 
because of the airborne nature of the disease, masking is more 
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important when in a classroom learning setting (indoors, with 
others, and with some people talking) than when moving 
between classrooms (especially if walking alone, outdoors 
and in silence). Likewise, rules in gyms that masks should 
be worn when walking between equipment but not when 
exercising on the equipment are nonsensical, since heavy 
breathing during exercise will increase emission of viral 
particles30,31.
The benefit of mask wearing by all is not dependent on the 
size of a group, so suggestions that masking is needed only 
above a certain occupancy threshold means that unmasked 
smaller groups would carry a preventable risk (and also provide 
a false sense of security).
A major risk setting for transmission of COVID-19 is lunch and 
tea breaks, since masks must be removed for eating and drinking, 
and because people often sit at close quarters and talk. To 
reduce transmission, refreshment breaks should ideally be 
taken out of doors. If this is not possible, physical distancing 
should be increased and silence maintained while unmasked. 
Socialising in breaks could occur, for example, during 
the walk to the café (while masked) but not while eating.
A few people have a medical reason not to mask (e.g. neuro-
diverse or anxious)32; in some universities they may obtain a 
lanyard to indicate they are exempt.
Space people out (physical distancing, joining remotely, 
cohorting)
Physical distancing (sometimes called social distancing) is 
effective at reducing droplet transmission, since droplets fall 
to the ground within a few feet due to gravity33. Physical dis-
tancing also protects against airborne transmission, since most 
airborne particles are spread via close contact, especially 
when a person is in the direct stream of someone else’s 
exhaled breath (think of smelling the garlic on someone’s 
breath—you might be able to smell it across the room but it is 
much stronger at close range)7.
Many university guidelines stipulate a specific physical 
distance such as 1 or 1.5 metres to space desks apart. Whilst 
this is a useful rule of thumb, a “safe” distance cannot be 
calculated precisely, since a) airborne particles spread through-
out a room within about 30 minutes (and can remain even after 
the room has been vacated), hence time spent indoors must 
also be factored in; b) if nobody is wearing a mask, viral emis-
sion is considerably greater (hence, close contact is more 
risky—and conversely if everyone is masked, it is less risky); 
c) singing or loud talking increases viral transmission (hence, 
again, close contact is more risky); d) even wide separa-
tion will not protect fully against the turbulent jets emitted 
when a symptomatic person coughs or sneezes33.
Figure 2 summarises this information in a semi-quantitative 
way33; a paper offering a quantified version of this diagram is 
available as a preprint34.
In reality, however, university staff are often given a rigid 
separation distance to impose. It is important not to be overly 
reassured by such measures but instead take account of the 
multiple influences on transmission risk. Separating desks is a 
good idea, but also—and more importantly—those responsible 
for local policy should encourage people to get fully vacci-
nated, keep masks on, and speak quietly rather than loudly 
(and perhaps keep talking to a minimum while indoors). 
The fewer people who are physically present in the room, the 
lower the risk of transmitting the virus. This is partly because 
desks can be more spread out, but it is also because fewer 
breathing humans will be exhaling virus into the air. Ideally, 
a blended learning option should be offered in which those 
who wish to join the class remotely are supported to do so 
(especially if they or a household member are clinically 
vulnerable). Staggering the start dates of students does not 
appear to reduce on-campus transmission35.
There is no evidence that introducing freestanding plastic 
screens (or other barriers between desks) reduces the risk of 
transmission or alters the benefit that is conferred by spac-
ing desks, and such barriers may interfere with the effective cir-
culation of clean air12. Hence, universities should not attempt 
to install screens as a substitute for distancing or engineering 
controls.
Deliver clean air by ventilation, filtration or ultraviolet 
(UV) inactivation
Heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) technolo-
gies and standards are designed to deliver clean air and ther-
mal comfort to indoor spaces. The literature on HVAC uses 
the key concept of air changes per hour (ACH), and generally 
recommends 4 to 6 per hour equivalent for an average teach-
ing room, achieved through natural or mechanical ventila-
tion, air filtration or sterilisation (note that higher ACH rates 
are needed for some activities such as singing or gym36). 
Another key metric for air quality when portable filtration 
units are used is the clean air delivery rate (CADR); these and 
other standards are explained in a recent review paper37.
Ventilation in this context is defined as the intentional delivery 
of the outside air to a building’s indoor space. The obvious 
way to do this is to open windows (preferably on opposite 
sides of a room, or with a door open, to get a through 
draught). The effectiveness of opening windows depends on 
the design of the window and also on the weather. In one 
modelling study (currently a preprint38), the most effective 
single intervention for reducing aerosols was natural ventila-
tion through the full opening of six windows all day during 
the winter—a measure which led to a 14-fold decrease in 
cumulative dose of aerosol. This was more effective than 
universal use of surgical masks (which led to an 8-fold 
decrease). In the spring and summer, natural ventilation with 
windows fully open all day was less effective (2-fold decrease 
in cumulative dose). In the winter, partly opening two windows 
all day or fully opening six windows at the end of each 
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Figure 2. Risk of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission in different settings, assuming 
people are asymptomatic (adapted from 33 under Creative Commons licence).
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class produced an approximately 2-fold decrease in cumu-
lative dose of aerosols. In that study, opening windows 
during breaks only had minimal effect (≤ 1.2-fold decrease). 
The conclusion from this study is that if it is not possible to 
open windows more than a crack, a different way of cleaning 
the air is likely needed.
Whereas mechanical ventilation in domestic settings tends to 
occur through extractor fans (such as those in kitchens and 
bathrooms) or ceiling fans (often used as an alternative to 
air conditioning in hot climates), most mechanical ventila-
tion in universities and colleges is through large systems which 
take in air through air handling units and supply and extract 
through a system of ducts and diffuser grilles. Lecture thea-
tres and laboratories are generally mechanically ventilated via 
centralised HVAC systems. Hence it should not be assumed 
that if a space has no opening windows, it must be inadequately 
ventilated.
If indoor spaces are fitted with air conditioning systems, it is 
important to ensure that air which is removed is not recycled 
unfiltered (or inadequately filtered) back into that space12. 
Air conditioning is not mechanical ventilation, though it may 
be linked to mechanical ventilation via large, central HVAC 
systems which both filter and heat (or cool) the air as needed. 
More problematic are isolated rooms fitted with their own 
local air conditioning systems, which are less likely to include 
any filtration and may give a false sense that the room is 
being ventilated.
The level of ventilation and occupancy in ventilated spaces 
can be approximated by measuring carbon dioxide (CO
2
) lev-
els, since this is present in higher concentrations in exhaled air 
than in outdoor air. The higher the CO
2
 level in a room, the 
more exhaled air (and hence, potentially, the more virus) there 
is. Before the pandemic, indoor air quality standards were 
generally set around the goal of avoiding “sick building syn-
drome” (with symptoms such as headaches a sense of stuffi-
ness, due to accumulation of multiple contaminants in the air) 
and clearing body odours and other smells. 
Whilst CO
2
 levels can be used to approximate the risk of 
COVID-19 transmission39, they are only a proxy for this risk. 
With that caveat, some authors have suggested that CO
2
 lev-
els might be used strategically in negotiations with employers40. 
Figure 3 shows some suggested cut-off levels for denoting 
“low risk” (below 700 ppm), “medium risk” (700–800 ppm), 
“high risk” (800–1000 ppm) and “very high risk” (>1000 ppm), 
though other publications recommend slightly different cut-
offs for these categories. Measures to address moderate risk 
include opening classroom doors and windows, opening win-
dows between classes, and reducing the number of students in 
the classroom. If levels indicate “high risk” despite these meas-
ures, infrastructure changes (such as mechanical or portable 
air filters) are needed. 
Note that the cut-off values for unacceptable CO
2
 levels in 
Figure 3 are substantially lower than those in many official 
documents (e.g. from UK Health and Safety Executive, who 
recommend 1500 ppm41). This is because the higher cut-off 
values were set historically for an entirely different purpose
When it is not possible or desirable to use ventilation (e.g. for 
energy efficiency reasons) to maintain clean air, other kinds 
of control are needed. There are two main kinds: an inbuilt 
mechanical filter (for which standards are expressed as the 
Figure 3. Risk classification scheme for carbon dioxide (CO2) levels in indoor air (adapted under Creative Commons licence 
from 40).
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minimum efficiency reporting value (MERV) in the USA37 or 
ISO 16890 in Europe) or a portable air cleaner fitted with a 
HEPA (high-efficiency particulate air) filter. Such filtration sys-
tems have been designed to remove particles of many different 
kinds and sizes (e.g. dust, pollen, smoke, bacteria, viruses).
The SARS-CoV-2 virus is approximately 100 nanometres 
(0.1 μm) in diameter (though it is unlikely to travel naked so 
the size of particle to be filtered will be larger than this). The 
system installed should be efficient in the 0.1 to 1 μm range. Of 
note to those in charge of supplying clean air to old-fashioned 
university or school buildings is this warning: “most central 
mechanical systems were not designed for HEPA filters. Instead, 
these systems use filters on a different rating scale, minimum 
efficiency reporting value, or MERV, and typically use a 
low-grade filter (eg, MERV 8) that captures only approxi-
mately 15% of 0.3- to 1-μm particles, 50% of 1- to 3-μm 
particles, and 74% of 3- to 10μm particles. For infection 
control, buildings should upgrade to MERV 13 filters when 
possible, which could capture approximately 66%, 92%, and 
98%, of these sized particles, respectively”37.
Upgrading from MERV8 to MERV13 filters (or the ISO equiva-
lent) is potentially a rapid, affordable and effective inter-
vention for universities and colleges in some settings, but 
higher-grade filters may induce a bigger pressure drop so 
unless the fan speeds can be increased, the ventilation rate may 
be inadequate.
Portable air filtration units fitted with HEPA filters are highly 
effective at removing aerosols in the 0.1 to 1 μm range42–45. 
In the Villiers study described above, one HEPA filter was 
as effective as two windows partly open all day during the 
winter (2.5-fold decrease in cumulative dose of aerosols) while 
two HEPA filters were more effective (4-fold decrease)38. 
A combination of interventions (masks along with natu-
ral ventilation and HEPA filtration) were the most effective, 
producing a 30-fold decrease in cumulative aerosol dose38. 
Aerosol scientists have begun to develop and test home-made, 
low-cost box fans fitted with HEPA filters as a quick and 
effective solution for improving mechanical ventilation in 
poorly-ventilated spaces46.
Ultraviolet (UV) light (from sunlight or radiation lamps) has 
been shown to destroy SARS-CoV-2 in numerous studies47, 
though if this method is used it is important to select appro-
priate units that do not generate ozone. UV sterilization holds 
potential for enhancing safety in indoor spaces where risk 
of transmission is particularly high (e.g. hospitals, gyms). In 
a small before-and-after study published as a preprint, a com-
bination of HEPA filtration and UV sterilisation was highly 
effective at removing bioaerosols (including but not lim-
ited to SARS-CoV-2) in a COVID-19 surge ward and inten-
sive care unit in one hospital, though the contribution of the 
UV component to the result is unknown43.
Electronic air cleaning systems, for example those which 
use ozone, are of no proven efficacy in reducing COVID-19 
transmission48; they currently have no place in preventing 





 monitors cannot be used to monitor the quality 
of filtered air.
In the longer term, universities should consider the need for 
a paradigm shift in the design and ventilation of buildings, 
to improve air quality standards and ensure that all indoor 
spaces meet these through adequate ventilation, filtration or 
sterilisation36.
Test, trace and isolate while COVID-19 incidence is high
In the context of high incidence of COVID-19 and an unvac-
cinated or partially-vaccinated student population, frequent 
testing of asymptomatic staff and students along with con-
tact tracing and support to isolate has been shown to reduce 
on-campus transmission substantially35. While lateral flow 
device (LFD) tests can detect asymptomatic cases and break 
chains of transmission, this measure depends on the efficacy 
of efforts to track and trace contacts and maintain and sup-
port the isolation of infected individuals. Anyone who is symp-
tomatic should isolate immediately and take a gold-standard 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test, irrespective of the sta-
tus of their LFD test. Universities should ensure clear and 
consistent communication on this matter as confusion still 
abounds.
Anyone with symptoms, even if they are perceived to be 
“just a cold”, should isolate immediately, and a negative LFD 
should never override the more accurate PCR test (see below). 
Note that the most common symptoms of delta infection 
(in order: headache, runny nose, sneezing, sore throat, loss 
of smell, fatigue) are different from the standard triad of 
cough, fever and shortness of breath which are still widely 
used to prompt PCR testing49. Hybrid teaching options greatly 
facilitate immediate isolation, and students and staff with 
symptoms that may be due to COVID-19 should be sup-
ported to engage remotely if they are well enough to do so. 
Track and trace efforts are constrained by the specifics of 
the system. Universities may have additional information 
that can be harnessed to provide a further layer of safety. In 
the UK for example, individuals sharing a confined space for 
extended periods of time, for example, may not be contacted 
by the official Track and Trace system but could be identified 
via attendance lists.
Some authors have questioned the validity and expense of 
mass asymptomatic testing in populations where incidence of 
COVID-19 is low, due to the very large number of tests required 
to detect small numbers of positive cases50. A recent mod-
elling study suggests that as vaccination rates rise and the 
incidence of COVID-19 falls, the cost-benefit balance of 
frequent testing becomes less favourable16. However, at the 
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time of writing the UK is a long way from a low-incidence 
state and we strongly recommend maintaining asymptomatic 
testing. Below, we explain some of the science behind the tests.
Lateral flow devices (LFDs), which detect the presence of 
virus antigen in the nose and throat using a swab sample tested 
in a flow device (like a pregnancy test)51. Multiple types of 
LFD test are available, and they are designed to test peo-
ple (perhaps repeatedly) who are not displaying overt COVID 
symptoms. LFD tests are all highly specific i.e. they are very 
unlikely to give a positive result if the person is not infected. 
But LFD tests are not particularly sensitive (i.e. less able to 
detect very small quantities of the virus) compared with the 
gold standard PCR (polymerase chain reaction) tests. This 
means that testing negative on an LFD is not a “green light” i.e. 
it does NOT guarantee that the individual is not infected with 
SARS-CoV-2, so they should continue to practice mitiga-
tions as advised. On the other hand, testing positive on an 
LFD means it is highly likely the person is infected (it is a 
“red light”, indicating that they are potentially infectious). 
Such individuals should self-isolate immediately, report 
the positive test, and order a confirmatory PCR test as soon 
as possible. A positive LFD test should trigger a call from 
the Track and Trace service.
Whilst LFD tests are used mainly in people without 
symptoms, they are actually more likely to be positive if the 
infected person is symptomatic (probably because such 
people have higher levels of the virus)52. However, people with 
a positive LFD may well be infectious despite lack of 
symptoms—hence the value of these tests in identifying infec-
tious cases (who should then isolate) and reducing the chance 
of a super-spreader event on campus. LFD tests also tend to 
reflect past infection (they are more likely to be positive 2 
weeks after the onset of symptoms than on the day symptoms 
appear)52.
In sum, the on-site LFD testing established at many UK 
university sites appears to be evidence-based (though not scien-
tifically perfect) and its regular, frequent use is recommended 
while the incidence of COVID-19 remains high. Those with 
symptoms also need a PCR test.
Clinically vulnerable staff and students
Universities and colleges have a duty of care to their staff and 
students. They must provide a safe environment for learn-
ing, teaching, and working. If a person has a condition or 
risk state which makes them vulnerable to COVID-19 and its 
complications, the institution must take account of this. 
Increased vulnerability to COVID-19 occurs in people who 
are immunosuppressed (including those on medication which 
suppresses the immune system, and pregnant women), those 
with certain long-term conditions, older age groups, some 
minority ethnic groups and those who are overweight. These 
risk groups were considered in detail in the Independent 
SAGE report1.
The evidence supports a policy of vulnerable groups (whether 
staff or students) being supported to work from home if 
possible while the incidence of COVID-19 is high. If they must 
enter indoor spaces they should be advised to wear a respira-
tor mask for self-protection, and it is particularly important 
for others in the room to wear a mask to maximise source 
control. If clinically vulnerable people are required to enter 
indoor spaces, those spaces should be adequately ventilated 
(confirmed using CO
2
 levels) or have high-quality air filtration 
systems (MERV13 or HEPA) installed.
Interventions for which there is no evidence (“hygiene 
theatre”)
We found no scientific evidence to support taking temperatures, 
sanitising hands before entering the classroom (though 
washing hands when they are dirty and after going to the 
lavatory is of course a general hygiene measure), restrict-
ing the sharing or exchange of fomites (i.e. potentially 
contaminated objects such as pens, paper, books or other study 
materials), wearing face visors, or separating desks with plastic 
screens. Such “hygiene theatre”, which links to a discredited 
hypothesis that the virus is spread mainly or exclusively by 
droplets53, could potentially distract staff and students from 
measures which do work.
In relation to sanitising, hand hygiene is recognised good prac-
tice for the prevention of many infectious diseases, so it should 
not be dismissed or discouraged (but equally, should not 
be over-emphasised). In relation to fomite transmission, a 
large Brazilian study detected no SARS-CoV-2 virus on over 
400 samples of mask fronts, cell phones, paper money or card 
machines during a wave of the pandemic54. In other words, there 
is some evidence against the importance of fomite transmission. 
However, since the mode of transmission remains contested, 
it would seem sensible to discourage widespread sharing of 
pencils, books and other objects among students.
Conclusion
The key to effective prevention of COVID-19 is acknowledge-
ment of its predominantly airborne mode of transmission. 
Many widely-promoted measures—hand sanitising, strict 1- or 
2-metre distancing, fomite precautions—wrongly assume an 
exclusively droplet mode of transmission assume and are there-
fore ineffective. Such thinking also dominates the thinking 
of senior management and many staff and students.
Acknowledging the importance of airborne transmission 
should lead to policies such as: a) masking at all times while 
indoors, with encouragement to wear higher-grade respirators 
for best protection (especially if clinically vulnerable); b) con-
tinuing attention to physical distancing but in a way that does 
not assume that a particular interval between desks makes the 
space “safe”, and using additional measures (joining remotely, 
cohorting, frequent breaks) to reduce crowding and time 
spent indoors; c) a greater focus on engineering controls 
(ventilation and/or filtration of air). In addition, university and 
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college staff should encourage and facilitate vaccination, attend 
to testing and tracing, and be ready to instigate tighter controls 
(e.g. return to online teaching) if case numbers rise.
These measures should be implemented and evaluated. Moni-
toring of metrics such as CO
2
 levels and room occupancy 
rates may provide staff with hard data with which to negotiate 
with management.
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Vaccination:
The review is written specifically for a United Kingdom audience, and it is perhaps for that 
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remote and hybrid working, cohorting, and workplace bubbles. There may be limited 
published evidence on these strategies, and for this reason they may have been excluded, 
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basis. 
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group to another. For example, if a university or school has multiple offerings of the same 
subject, it may introduce rules to require students not to swap between offerings in a 
term/semester. Similarly, it might encourage staff work on campus only on designated days 
to minimise overlap between staff cohorts. 
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This review aims to provide a timely synthesis of the literature relevant to SARS-CoV-2 
transmission in an educational setting and of the available mitigation strategies that might be 
employed to facilitate a return of in-person university teaching. 
 
This is an ambitious piece and will be of value to those involved in delivering higher education 
during the pandemic. Helpfully, the authors critically evaluate a wide variety of potential 
mitigation strategies, highlighting those supported by published evidence, while importantly 
identifying those for which the evidence does not support continuation. In the former “effective” 
category, the authors include vaccination, mask wearing, physical distancing, engineering 
solutions (room ventilation and air filtration), test/trace/isolation, and blended learning. 
Approaches that the authors conclude to be “ineffective” include strict hand hygiene, restricting 
spread via fomites, the wearing of face shields, and the separation of individuals by plastic 
screens. 
 
The article is clear, well-written, and makes useful evidence-based recommendations. The authors 
may wish to consider the following critical comments, which might help to improve the article 
further. In particular, in their effort to provide a useful synthesis of the evidence, at times the 
distinction between published literature and their interpretation becomes unclear. It might be 
helpful, and would strengthen the review, if this distinction were to be made more obvious. 
 
Methods section:
The methods section describes a search of PubMed in September 2021 for the terms “SARS-
CoV-2”, “COVID-19”, “transmission”, “mitigation”, “school[s]” and “university/ies”, restricted 
initially to reviews. These were examined for relevant papers by “snowball searching”. It 
would be helpful to know the total number of articles assessed and to be provided with 
more detail about the processes and metrics used to evaluate their quality. Would a PRISMA 
diagram be valuable in this regard? The authors refer to the screening of articles, in part, by 
considering the impact factor of the journals in which they were published. While impact 
factors have some value as a heuristic for quality, this approach also has limitations. It 
○
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would be reassuring to learn how the threshold for impact factor was set and whether this 
was corrected for journal type, for example, clinical vs non-clinical journals. It would also be 
valuable to provide more detail on the methodologies employed to avoid the introduction 
of any bias. This might be provided in the Methods section or in a dedicated “limitations” 
section.
 
Main findings section: 
General comments:
This section provides a narrative synthesis of the above search. It is clearly written and 
generally well-referenced. In places, however, the referencing is less extensive and it is not 
always clear if this reflects a deficiency in the published literature. More clarity on this would 
be helpful in allowing readers to evaluate the validity of the recommendations. It might also 
be helpful to provide a quantification of the strength of the recommendations, perhaps 
along the lines of the GRADE (Grades of Recommendation Assessment, Development and 




It is stated that “.. this 90% cut-off is based on a single preprint modelling study [16] that has yet 
to be peer-reviewed.” Would the authors double check that this statement is true? The article 
appears to have been published on 31 August 2021 in Annals of Internal Medicine, although 
at the time of writing (24/10/2021), its status has not been updated on medRxiv. 
 
○
It is stated, “One key measure for improving safety is to make it very easy for people to get a 
vaccination on campus—for example by locating vaccination hubs close to settings frequented by 
target groups (e.g. outside lecture theatres or dining halls) and not requiring paperwork that 
people are unlikely to be carrying.” This is an important point, but is this an opinion of the 
authors or are there empirical studies to support it? Is it possible to make clearer the 
distinction between available data, knowledge gaps, and opinion? 
 
○
It is stated, “There have been claims that randomised controlled trial (RCT) evidence is the only 
“robust” way to test the impact of masks. This is incorrect, because most such RCTs are designed 
only to test the hypothesis that the mask protects the wearer over a short period.” Again, this is 
very important. Is it possible to provide citations for the relevant articles? Similarly, 
elsewhere in this section, comments are made such as “Perhaps the most persuasive 
argument for masks in the university context is that if everyone wears one, there is a much lower 
risk that teaching will need to return to online as a result of rising case numbers”. These 
comments are important and would be strengthened if published evidence could be cited. 




It is stated, “The benefit of mask wearing by all is not dependent on the size of a group, so 
suggestions that masking is needed only above a certain occupancy threshold means that 
unmasked smaller groups would carry a preventable risk (and also provide a false sense of 
security).” Are there published studies available to support this? 
 
○
Figure 2 encodes “risk of transmission” graphically by using a red/amber/green colour 
scheme. Would it be possible to amend the figure to be more accessible for those with 
deficiencies in colour vision? I suspect that in its current form it would be challenging for 
○
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readers with deuteranopia or protanopia. 
 
In the section on testing, the authors might wish to consider a discussion of mass 
asymptomatic PCR testing of undergraduates, which has been shown both to be possible 
and effective in the university setting, for example, through the testing of pooled screening-
samples from groups of 10 to 12 students followed by individual testing of positive groups. 
This has recently been reviewed.2 
 
○
I do not feel able to comment usefully on the engineering solutions section, which falls 
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